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TIE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND NON-
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER IN
RE ALAPPAT AND IN RE WARMERDAM
C. Mark Kittredget
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Alappat, decided July 29, 1994, a sharply divided en
banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of
an expanded panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). The ex-
panded panel had affirmed an examiner's rejection of a claim related
to a computer program as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because it recited a mathematical algorithm.2 In reversing the PTO
and allowing the subject claim, the Federal Circuit disapproved the
PTO's practice of rejecting claims related to computer programs
merely because they 'read on' a general purpose computer program-
med according to the subject program. In addition, the Federal Circuit
appeared to recognize that a "mathematical algorithm" could be pat-
entable subject matter, and appeared to signal a shift towards broad
recognition of the patentability of computer programs, standing alone.
It thus appeared from Alappat that the Federal Circuit would no longer
tolerate perfunctory rejections of patent claims that could be termed
"mathematical algorithms".
However, only two weeks later, in In re Warmerdam3 a three-
judge panel of the Federal Circuit found certain claims directed to a
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1. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2. The Federal Circuit also addressed an important jurisdictional issue (upholding the
Commissioner's right to empanel an expanded panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences to reconsider decisions of an original panel that the Commissioner disagrees with) and
reaffirmed its en banc decision in In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) requiring the
PTO to apply the requirements of 35 U.S.C § 112 6 when considering the patentability of
means-plus-function claims. While these aspects of the Court's opinion are noteworthy, this
comment focuses on the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis.
3. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Warmerdam was decided by Circuit Judges Plager,
Lourie and Clevenger, with the opinion written by Judge Plager. In Alappat, Judges Plager and
Lourie concurred with the majority on both the jurisdictional and substantive issues, whereas
Judge Clevenger dissented on the jurisdictional issue and did not reach the substantive issue.
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method and apparatus to control the motion of robotic machines to be
non-patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although
Warmerdam did not specifically find that the subject claims were
"mathematical algorithms", it used language strongly suggesting that
"mathematical algorithms" are, per se, not patentable. While
Warmerdam is theoretically reconcilable with Alappat, at a minimum,
it shows confusion because it provides strong support for the PTO's
routine rejection of claims that can be described as "mathematical al-
gorithms", and because it failed to address the Alappat decision.4
II. THE CONTRASTING DECISIONS
A. The Alappat Decision
Judge Rich, writing for the majority in Alappat, framed the § 101
analysis with the four modem Supreme Court decisions interpreting
35 U.S.C. § 101: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which broadly defined
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and the trilogy of
Diamond v. Diehr,6 Parker v. Flook,7 and Gottschalk v. Benson,' each
of which considered the patentability of computer programs and re-
lated algorithms and discussed the general exceptions to the broad
scope of patentable subject matter under § 101.
Judge Rich first emphasized "that Congress intended § 101 to ex-
tend to 'anything under the sun that is made by man'."9 He then noted
that, notwithstanding the apparent broad sweep of § 101, the Supreme
Court has recognized "three categories of subject matter for which one
may not obtain patent protection, namely 'laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas'."' ° Judge Rich further noted that "the
Supreme Court also has held that certain mathematical subject matter
is not, standing alone, entitled to patent protection.""
Judge Rich then emphasized that "the Supreme Court never in-
tended to create an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter
4. Alappat was mentioned only once by the Warmerdam Court. See Section B below.
5. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
6. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
8. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
9. Alappat, 33 F. 2d at 1542 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, quoting S.Rep. No.
1979, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,-5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 (1952)).
Contrast Warmerdam where the Court began its discussion by noting that "[d]espite the oft-
quoted statement in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act that Congress intended that
statutory subject matter 'includes anything under the sun that is made by man,' .. . Congress did
not so mandate." Wamerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358 (citations omitted).
10. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185).
11. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, Flook, 437 U.S. 584, and Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63).
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excluded from § 101," but was merely explaining that "certain types
of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing
more than abstract ideas."12 Judge Rich thus framed the § 101 ques-
tion as:
whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied
mathematical concept, whether categorized as a mathematical
formula, mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the
like, which in essence represents nothing more than a 'law of na-
ture,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract idea'(emphasis added).13
That is, a "mathematical algorithm" is non-patentable subject matter
only if it is "in essence... nothing more than a 'law of nature', 'natu-
ral phenomenon', or 'abstract idea'."14
With the issue thus framed, the majority specifically found that
the subject claim, viewed as a whole, "is not a disembodied mathemat-
ical concept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea', but
rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible
result." 15
This fact-specific finding provides little guidance for future ques-
tions regarding the patentability of claims encompassing, or directed
to, computer programs. However, in ruling that the subject claim was
patentable, the majority specifically rejected the PTO's argument that
it was unpatentable because it 'read on' a general purpose digital com-
puter programmed according to the claim. 6 Judge Rich emphasized
that "such programming creates a new machine because a general pur-
pose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions
from program software."17
Of possibly greater importance, however, was the court's framing
of the question in a way that appeared to severely limit the so-called
"mathematical algorithm" exception to § 101. Judge Rich did not go
so far as to hold that a claim to a computer program, by itself (i.e., one
not tied to a specific apparatus, such as a digital computer), may be
patentable. However, he appears to have stepped right up to that line:
"The fact that the four claimed means elements function to transform
one set of data to another through what may be viewed as a series of
mathematical calculations does not alone justify a holding that the
12. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543.
13. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
14. Id.
15. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
16. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544-45.
17. Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).
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claim as a whole is directed to non-statutory subject matter."'" Such
language suggests a willingness by the Federal Circuit to find a claim
directed to a computer program to be patentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as long as the claim as a whole "is not a disembodied mathe-
matical concept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea'."'19
The concurring opinion of Judges Newman and Rader in Alappat
provided even more encouragement that the Federal Circuit is leaning
toward a broader recognition that computer programs, standing alone,
constitute patentable subject matter.
Judge Newman wrote her concurring opinion with specific refer-
ence to the PTO's custom regarding computer-related inventions, em-
phasizing the distinction "between abstract mathematical principles
and their practical applications", and condemning the PTO's "histori-
cal practice of giving § 101 its narrowest possible reading".20 More-
over, through her analysis, Judge Newman appears to indicate that
Alappat's invention was patentable whether or not it was specifically
tied to computer hardware. In describing the invention, Judge New-
man noted:
The structure resides in the configuration by which the device oper-
ates ... , and is independent of how that configuration is provided.
The structure may reside in semiconductor chips and hardwired
connections, or be permanently embedded in the electronic form
designated read-only memory, or removably embedded in the elec-
tronic form designated random-access memory. It is not relevant to
§ 101 whether the structure is hardwired or programmed,
machine-readable or manually performed.2'
Judge Rader, in his concurring opinion, went further and specifi-
cally recognized that mathematical algorithms, even standing alone,
are not per se excluded from § 101. "Only algorithms which merely
represent discovered principles are excluded from § 101. '22 "[T]he
Supreme Court only denies patentable subject matter status to algo-
rithms which are, in fact, simply laws of nature."'23
Judge Rader further emphasized that the claim must be viewed as
a whole, and that "if a digital circuit or its use would define an inven-
tion under § 101, then the same invention described in terms of 'a
mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer' should
18. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
19. Id.
20.. Alappat, 33 F. 3d at 1569.
21. Id. at 1570 (emphasis added).
22. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1582.
23. Id.
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be statutory subject matter as well."'24 Moreover, "[t]he limits on pat-
entable subject matter within § 101 do not depend on whether an in-
vention can be expressed as a mathematical relationship or algorithm.
Mathematics is simply a form of expression-a language."25
Finally, Judge Rader chastised the PTO, noting that it "has no
justification within the Patent Act to ignore algorithmic processes or
machines as 'useful Arts' within the scope of § 101. ' '26 He further
emphasized that "[t]his court should not permit the Patent and Trade-
mark Office to administratively emasculate research and development
in this area by precluding statutory protection for algorithmic
inventions." '27
B. The Warmerdam Decision
In re Warmerdam involved method and apparatus claims related
to control of the motion of robotic machines to avoid collisions with
other objects. The method claims defined "a method for generating a
data structure" representing the shape of such machines and formed
the basis of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis.2"
Judge Plager, writing for a three-judge panel, began the § 101
analysis by emphasizing the limits to patentable subject matter. In
direct contrast to Alappat, Judge Plager noted: "[d]espite the oft-
quoted statement in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act that
Congress intended that statutory subject matter 'includes anything
under the sun that is made by man,' . . . Congress did not so man-
date.' 2 9 Judge Plager then used narrowing language to emphasize the
limits of § 101: "Congress included in patentable subject matter only
those things that qualify as 'any ... process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any.., improvement thereof... '."3o It is
noteworthy that, without discussion, the Court suggested a favorable
comparison could be drawn to In re Alappat.3 1 This is the only place
in the Warmerdam opinion where Alappat is even mentioned.
As with Alappat, the Warmerdam Court noted the Supreme Court
cases of Diehr, Benson and Flook and recognized that they stand for
the "long-established principle, that patent protection is not available
24. Id. at 1582-83.
25. Id. at 1583.
26. Id. at 1583 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 1583.
28. Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1357.
29. Id. at 1358 (citation omitted).
30. Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358 (emphasis added)(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
31. Id.
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for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. '32 How-
ever, the Warmerdam Court then emphasized that:
Within Supreme Court guidance, this court and its predecessor, as
well as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), have sought to find
more precise definitions for the things excluded, but without com-
plete success. One notion that emerged and has been invoked in
the computer related cases is that a patent cannot be obtained for a
"mathematical algorithm".
3 3
Admitting the difficulty in "agree[ing] as to what is a 'mathemat-
ical algorithm,' "the Warmerdam court considered the method claims
against the prohibition that "laws of nature, natural phenomena [and]
abstract ideas" are not patentable.34
Accordingly, the § 101 question in Warmerdam was framed
thusly: "[w]hat is it that [the claimed] process does, and in doing it is
it other than what the Supreme Court must have understood to be
'laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract' ideas?" 35 This ap-
proach is not inconsistent with that pursued by Judge Rich in the Alap-
pat decision. However, after significant discussion emphasizing the
mathematical nature of the method claims, Judge Plager focused the
issue more narrowly (at least in terms of the scope of patentable sub-
ject matter): "whether the claim is for a process that goes beyond
"136simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'natural phenomena'.
With the issue thus framed, the court had little difficulty in con-
cluding that the claims "describe nothing more than the manipulation
of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic 'abstract idea'. 37
Citing an 1874 Supreme Court opinion, Judge Plager then emphasized
that "an idea of itself is not patentable."3" Judge Plager then con-
cluded (without citing any authority) that "taking several abstract
ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic
equation. 39
32. Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 1358-59 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 1358-9. However, the Court's broad statement that "a patent cannot be obtained
for a "mathematical algorithm," remains. Id. at 1359. Moreover, through its analysis the
Warmerdam Court continued to emphasize that the method claims were '"mathematical in na-
ture," and implicitly recognized that "mathematical algorithms" are not patentable. Id. at 1360.
Such language and analysis will provide strong encouragement for the PTO to continue its rou-
tine practice of rejecting claims that can be described as "mathematical algorithms."
35. Id. at 1359.
36. Id. at 1360 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 1360.
38. Id. at 1360 (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507
(1874)).
39. Id. at 1360.
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The Warmerdam Court thus found that the subject method claims
were not patentable subject matter under § 101. While Warmerdam
can be reconciled with Alappat, to do so probably eviscerates any sug-
gestion in Alappat that mathematical algorithms, or computer pro-
grams that can be described as such, are patentable subject matter
standing alone (i.e., as method claims not tied to a specific apparatus,
such as a computer). Moreover, Warmerdam provides strong support
for the PTO to continue its perfunctory and routine practice of re-
jecting claims that can be described as "mathematical algorithms."'
Such conclusions are supported by the Warmerdam Court's han-
dling of one of the apparatus claims. Claim number 5, which had been
rejected by the PTO as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, was for "a
machine having a memory which contains data.., generated by the
method of any of [the method claims]."'" That is, claim 5 appears to
define nothing more than a computer with data in its memory gener-
ated by methods that are not patentable under § 101. The PTO did not
reject this claim under any § 101 theory, and, accordingly, the Federal
Circuit was not required to consider whether it covered patentable
subject matter. However, before beginning the indefiniteness analysis
under § 112, Judge Plager emphasized that "[c]laim 5 is for a
machine, and is clearly patentable subject matter."'42
Stating that such an apparatus claim is patentable subject matter
under § 101 obviously strengthens the Alappat Court's dismissal of
the PTO's practice of rejecting such claims drafted so broadly that
they would 'read on' a general purpose computer programmed accord-
ing to the claim. However, the Warmerdam Court's statement that "a
patent cannot be obtained for a mathematical algorithm", along with
its analysis emphasizing the "mathematical nature" of the method
claims, will bolster the PTO's long-standing practice of routinely re-
jecting such claims.
I. CONCLUSION
The Warmerdam opinion supports the majority's holding in
Alappat that dismissed the PTO's 'knee-jerk' rejection of computer
program patent claims that are drafted broadly enough to read on a
general purpose computer programmed according to the claim. How-
40. See also, In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376,33 USPQ 2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Trovato,
decided December 19, 1994, the Federal Circuit affirmed a rejection of certain claims as non-
statutory subject matter under § 101 because they "recite[d] a mathematical algorithm" that was
not applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps. Id. at 1197.
41. Id. at 1358-60.
42. Id. at 1360.
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ever, Warmerdam greatly weakens any suggestion in Alappat that the
Federal Circuit is moving towards broader recognition of the patenta-
bility of mathematical algorithms, or computer programs that can be
described as such. At a minimum, Warmerdam provides the PTO
with language that will support a continuance of its routine practice of
rejecting computer program patent claims that can be described as
"mathematical algorithms".
Accordingly, claims draftsmen working in this area should con-
tinue to include a range of patent claims that tie the subject computer
program to general purpose computers, as well as to specific ma-
chines, programmed according to the subject program.
